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WHEN GOOD MERGERS GO BAD: CONTROLLING
CORPORATE MANAGERS WHO SUFFER A CHANGE OF
HEART
Celia R. Taylor *
I. INTRODUCTION
We are living in volatile times both politically and economi-
cally. Uncertainty plagues the United States economy and scan-
dals rock the corporate world. Much attention is now focused on
corporate behavior, including rules and standards governing the
actions of corporate management. Now more than ever, the laws
governing corporate action need examination and understanding.
One important area for such consideration is how corporate man-
agers should behave when their corporation considers undergoing
a merger or acquisition.
Few events in corporate affairs are as significant as a merger
or acquisition. For the corporations involved, such a transaction
fundamentally alters their daily existence. After the completion of
the merger, the existence of one corporation will dissolve and the
other will operate in a new structure. In addition to altering cor-
porate form, mergers and acquisitions have a profound impact on
people. The lives of officers, directors, shareholders, employees,
customers, vendors, and other corporate participants are affected
to various degrees. Merger parties spend large amounts of time
and money examining the legal and business implications of en-
gaging in a transaction. While this examination takes place, cir-
cumstances may change. The recent downturn in the United
States and world economies caused many merger parties to re-
consider their plans.
• Associate Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law. B.A., 1986, The
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So what happens when a merger goes sour? How should direc-
tors and officers respond? Although it is not at all unusual for dif-
ficulties to arise during the process-for example, hostile bidders
enter the picture, or bidding structures change-the rules govern-
ing corporate management behavior when this occurs frequently
are analyzed inadequately. As discussed below, most legal guid-
ance in this area focuses on corporate law and addresses the fidu-
ciary duties of directors engaging in mergers. Largely ignored in
the cases-although increasingly the topic of academic debate'-
is the role contract law plays in the process and the impact those
rules have on directors. This article argues that, in general,
courts are undervaluing contract law doctrine. An over-emphasis
on corporate fiduciary duties may permit corporate directors to
breach agreements without bearing costs that would otherwise
attach.
This article examines these issues through the lens of the re-
cent decision of the Court of Chancery of Delaware in IBP, Inc. v.
Tyson Foods, Inc.,2 to show that this undervaluation of contract
doctrine is not necessary. Tyson is helpful in this area because it
facilitates a detailed discussion about the duties of directors en-
gaging in mergers at a time when corporate management behav-
ior merits close scrutiny. By looking at Tyson, this article explores
much broader issues of the interplay of corporate and contract
law in governing corporate behavior when merger parties change
their minds about the advisability of a transaction.
When an aborted merger is challenged in court, decisions ex-
amining appropriate directorial action tend to address the situa-
tion where a seller attempts to withdraw from a merger agree-
ment because a "better" offer is presented.' However, this
addresses only half the equation. What should be done when the
buyer in a merger decides the deal is no longer to its liking? The
1. See, e.g., Victor Brudney, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C.
L. REV. 595 (1997); Jonathan R. Macey, Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claims: Obligations
to Nonshareholder Constituencies from a Theory of the Firm Perspective, 84 CORNELL L.
REV. 1266 (1999).
2. 789 A.2d 14 (Del. Ch. 2001).
3. See, e.g., Allegheny Energy, Inc. v. DQE, Inc., 171 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 1999) (grant-
ing specific performance of merger contract.to acquiring corporation given uniqueness of
target company and difficulty in determining monetary damages); Peabody Holding Co. v.
Costain Group PLC, 813 F. Supp. 1402 (E.D. Mo. 1993) (holding that plaintiffs were enti-
tled to permanent injunction against defendants' sale of business it contracted to pur-
chase).
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question of how to deal with a rejected seller is largely unre-
solved. That is the precise question that the Court of Chancery of
Delaware faced in Tyson. To fully grasp the implications of that
decision, a basic understanding of the complex issues mergers
raise is helpful.
While the business aspects of every merger necessarily will dif-
fer depending on the corporations involved, the legal standards
governing the process of conducting a merger are more certain
and uniform. Corporate law in every jurisdiction stipulates tech-
nical steps that require compliance, such as shareholder approval
of the transaction.4 Compliance with these procedural issues is
merely a small part of the decision making process. Directors-
who bear the primary responsibility for deciding whether to per-
mit their corporation to participate in a merger-must be con-
cerned about substantive issues of shareholder welfare, fairness,
and compliance because corporate law imposes fiduciary duties
upon them. The law is clear that directors bear certain duties
while engaging in the merger process, commonly understood to
include the duties of care and loyalty. Corporate law provides
general parameters for those duties, but does not state them with
great precision. Many courts and commentators have tried to
clarify the issue, with varying degrees of success.5
Relative rights and obligations are particularly complex in the
merger context due to an intricate web of governing laws. In addi-
tion to corporate law, contract law concerns are critical to the
merger process. Contract law strongly supports notions of "free-
dom of contract" in the market place, allowing parties to freely
4. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-i11-103 (2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c)
(2001); Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-4-11.04(b) (Cum. Supp. 2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-11-
02(a), -03(a) (2000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.78(d) (Anderson 2001); see also, e.g.,
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 11.04(b)-(h) (1999) (requiring board and shareholder approval
for a merger of two or more corporations).
5. See, e.g., Rizzo v. MacManus Group, Inc., 158 F. Supp. 2d 297 (S.D.N.Y. 2001);
Shepard v. Meridian Ins. Group, Inc., 137 F. Supp. 2d 1096 (S.D. Ind. 2001); McMichael v.
United States Filter Corp., No. EOCV-99-182 VAP, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3918 (C.D. Cal.
Feb. 22, 2001); Parnes v. Bally Entm't Corp., No. 15192, 2001 Del. Ch. LEXIS 34 (Del. Ch.
Feb. 23, 2001); Edward S. Adams & Arijit Mukherji, Spin-Offs, Fiduciary Duty and the
Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 15 (1999); Wells M. Engledow, Structuring Corporate Board
Action to Meet the Ever-Decreasing Scope of Revlon Duties, 63 ALA. L. REV. 505 (1999); Mi-
chael A. Stanchfield, Fiduciary Duties in Negotiated Acquisition: Questioning the Legal
Requirement for "Outs", 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 2261 (2001); Barry M. Wertheimer, The
Shareholders'Appraisal Remedy and How Courts Determine Fair Value, 47 DUKE L.J. 613
(1998).
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craft the terms and conditions of their relationships. Merger
agreements are heavily negotiated, complex documents. Once
completed, contract law dictates that each merger party assumes
the rights and obligations detailed in their agreement. In addi-
tion, contract law provides a remedy for the breach of any agree-
ment made. It provides the framework necessary to protect
merger parties during the period of vulnerability between con-
tractual agreement and full performance.'
The problem for directors is that the obligations imposed on
them by contract law and those imposed by corporate law may
conflict. Contract law demands that directors either honor their
commitments or pay the price of breach, while corporate law du-
ties may demand that directors dishonor their merger agreement.
If that action is justified under corporate law, has a breach of con-
tract occurred? Does compliance with corporate duties justify non-
performance of the merger agreement? If so, the merger party
wishing to proceed with the transaction may be out of luck be-
cause justified non-performance under a contract is not a breach
and does not entitle the non-breaching party to remedy.7 The ten-
sions created by the conflicting demands of corporate and contract
law in the merger area and the possible remedies for resolving
the conflict often are not raised or addressed, providing directors
with insufficient guidance.'
In Tyson, the Court of Chancery of Delaware reduced this lack
of guidance by requiring specific performance of a merger agree-
ment between IBP, Inc. ("IBP") and Tyson Foods, Inc. ("Tyson"),
despite Tyson's attempts to withdraw.9 The opinion sends a
strong message in support of valuing contract law principles in a
corporate setting. This is a message that needs to be heard. Con-
tract values are subordinated routinely to corporate principles
6. Protection during this period of vulnerability is one of the prime functions of con-
tract law and is relevant in all contexts where the promised future performance encour-
ages present reliance. A common example in a different context is the period of vulnerabil-
ity encountered by parties in a real estate transaction where a future exchange of property
is contingent upon the happening of specified events.
7. 9 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 443 (1979).
8. There is limited writing available concerning this conflict. See, e.g., Paul L. Regan,
Great Expectations? A Contract Law Analysis for Preclusive Corporate Lock-Ups, 21
CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (1999); Celia R. Taylor, "A Delicate Interplay": Resolving the Contract
and Corporate Law Tension in Mergers, 74 TUL. L. REV. 561 (1999).
9. IBP, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc. (In re IBP, Inc. S'holders Litig.), 789 A.2d 14 (Del.
Ch. 2001).
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when mergers are involved. This is unnecessary and improperly
devalues contract doctrine. Tyson is an important example of an
appropriately balanced approach.
In this case, the court granted a request for specific perform-
ance of a merger over the protests of the purchasing company.1"
The opinion is important for its consideration of both practical
and theoretical applications of doctrine. On the practical level, it
articulates standards to apply when a jilted seller in a merger
seeks remedy. It is noteworthy in this regard due to the present
lack of authority discussing the compensation of a thwarted
seller. This situation becomes more common during market
downturns."
Tyson is also valuable on the theoretical level, exemplifying
how correct application of the appropriate doctrine enables proper
analysis and strengthens all areas of the law. Too often when a
merger is the subject of dispute, parties and courts leap to apply
corporate doctrine without adequate concern for contract law. Ty-
son properly avoids this pitfall, thereby valuing the different re-
quirements and concerns of both contract and corporate law.
Tyson is noteworthy for its careful analysis of two specific is-
sues. First, it provides an in-depth discussion of the material ad-
verse effect clause contained within the parties' merger agree-
ment and how such a clause should be interpreted. 2 Second, it
considers whether specific performance is an appropriate remedy
when a buyer wants to walk away from a deal that the seller still
favors.13 This somewhat uncommon position of party interests
gives the court a chance to expand the doctrine on specific per-
formance. It is particularly important given the strong indica-
tions that the number of jilted sellers will increase in the future-
evidenced by the fact that "deals blow up at twice the rate of last
year." 4 Reasons for the increasing number of failed mergers in-
10. Id. at 84.
11. The tragic events of September 11, 2001 highlight this likelihood. See Andrew
Ross Sorkin & Jonathan D. Glater, Merger Deals are Stalled Amid Doubt, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 17, 2001, at C1 ("[Clompanies began quietly asking their lawyers.., if and how they
can back out of transactions ... ").
12. Tyson, 789 A.2d at 65-72.
13. Id. at 82-84.
14. Thor Valdmanis, Details Count If Deals Fall Apart: More Companies Carefully
Craft Merger Agreements, USA TODAY, July 17, 2001, at B3. The aborted merger of United
Airlines and US Airways was headed down this road until it became clear that the De-
20031
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elude the flagging economy and the large number of deals of very
high value contemplated over the last five years. 5 Regardless of
the precise cause of deal breakdowns, the likelihood of more suits
by sellers seeking specific performance makes the Tyson court's
analysis of the issue important. To help frame the legal reasoning
of the opinion, a brief overview of the nature of the dispute is use-
ful.
II. BACKGROUND OF TYSON
The course of merger negotiations between IBP, the nation's
number one beef and number two pork distributor, 6 and Tyson
Foods, the country's leading chicken distributor," is long and
complex. What follows is an abbreviated overview of significant
events relevant to the disputed merger agreement.
IBP and Tyson entered into a merger agreement (the "Merger
Agreement") after an active auction for IBP pitted Tyson against
Smithfield Foods, the largest pork producer in the country. 8
Throughout the auction, Tyson received information about the
business and financial conditions of IBP.19 This information re-
vealed many problems, including, among others, a downturn in
the beef industry that would generally affect IBP's profitability,
projections indicating that IBP would fall far short of its fiscal
year 2000 earnings estimates, and evidence of accounting fraud
in an IBP subsidiary, DFG, in the amount of approximately $30
million.2' DFG's problems were the subject of discussions between
IBP and the Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC").2 Fur-
thermore, in connection with the accounting fraud alleged, DFG
partment of Justice would not grant the anti-trust approval necessary for consummation
of the deal. Prior to learning of the regulatory stumbling block, US Airways, the seller in
the transaction, threatened United with a breach of contract action for wrongful termina-
tion of their $4.3 billion dollar merger agreement. Jayne O'Donnell, US Airways May Sue
United, Blaming it for Deal's Failure, USA TODAY, July 3, 2001, at B1.
15. See generally Jonathan D. Glater, More Failed Mergers Likely to End Up in Court,
CHATTANOOGA TIMES, July 14, 2001, at Cl; More Often, Broken Deals are Leading to Law-
suits, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS: THE DEALMAKER'S J., June 1, 2001, at 12.
16. Tyson, 789 A.2d at 21.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 22.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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was the subject of an asset impairment study, which led to the
reporting of an impairment charge of $60.4 million.22 This charge
indicated that DFG's cash flow would be significantly less than
expected. After all of these difficulties were disclosed, Tyson-
despite harboring doubts about IBP's management and opera-
tions-raised its bid for IBP by $4.00 per share.23
During final negotiations at the end of December 2000, it be-
came clear that Tyson had outlasted Smithfield. 24 Tyson's final of-
fer to IBP on December 31, 2000 was structured to include a
"Cash Offer" of $30 per IBP share, coupled with an "Exchange Of-
fer" in which Tyson would offer $30 of its stock for each share of
IBP stock to all shareholders who wished to remain investors in
the venture.25 The Cash Offer was on the table first and sched-
uled to close no later than February 28, 2001, unless closing con-
ditions were not satisfied as of that date.26 If the Cash Offer did
not close by February 28, Tyson then would offer the Cash Elec-
tion Merger option in which each IBP shareholder would be eligi-
ble to receive either $30 in cash, $30 in Tyson stock, or a combi-
nation of the two per share of IBP stock owned.27 The Cash
Election Merger was to close on or before May 15, 2001, unless
defined closing conditions were not satisfied. 28 IBP ultimately ac-
cepted Tyson's offer and the Merger Agreement was executed on
January 1, 2001.29 On January 12, 2001 Tyson's board of directors
met and approved the Merger Agreement. ° On the same date Ty-
22. Id. at 49.
23. Id. at 22.
24. Id. at 39. Smithfield initially bid $30 per IBP share, to be paid in full with Smith-
field stock. Id. The $28.50 per share all cash offer put forward by Tyson was considered
superior by IBP's special committee (on advice from J.P. Morgan). Id. Smithfield came
back with a $32 stock bid. Id. In response, Tyson added $1.50 per share to its cash offer.
At this point, Smithfield dropped out. Id.
25. Id. at 40.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. Conditions to closing included a requirement that no "Material Adverse Effect"
had occurred between execution of the Merger Agreement and closing of the offer. Id. "Ma-
terial Adverse Effect" ("MAE") was defined as "any event, occurrence or development of a
state of circumstances or facts which has had or reasonably could be expected to have a
Material Adverse Effect'. . . 'on the condition (financial or otherwise), business, assets,
liabilities or results of operations of [IBP] and [its] Subsidiaries taken as a whole ...." Id.
at 65 (citation omitted).
29. Id. at 40.
30. Id. at 44.
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son's shareholders met and approved the transaction.3' The direc-
tors advised the stockholders that the merger would be beneficial
to them and to the financial community, even in light of the risks
attendant to the deal. 2 By this time, however, Tyson's desire to
acquire IBP had cooled, for reasons that would be disputed at
trial. Neither Tyson nor IBP had positive first quarter results in
2001, mostly due to overall industry decline.3" Additionally, it was
discovered that a letter sent from the SEC to IBP's outside coun-
sel on December 29, 2000, which raised serious concerns about
IBP's financial affairs, had not been disclosed prior to entry into
the Merger Agreement.34 The existence of this letter was not
made known to IBP management or Tyson until after the Merger
Agreement was signed on January 1, 2001." Therefore, Tyson
signed the Merger Agreement without specific knowledge of the
SEC's concerns, but proceeded to obtain board and shareholder
approval after receiving notice of those concerns.
The Cash Offer did not close on February 28,2001.36 Although
some express conditions necessary for closing were satisfied as of
that date,37 Tyson claimed that IBP's failure to provide definitive
financial statements prevented Tyson from going forward. Ty-
son argued that IBP's failure to provide the data made it impossi-
ble for them to comply with the SEC requirements calling for an
acquiring corporation to provide pro forma financial information
before the SEC will authorize a merger.39 Tyson terminated the
Cash Offer on February 28, 2001, but did not make a determina-
tion that IBP had breached the Merger Agreement. 40 Pursuant to
the terms of the Merger Agreement, Tyson then was required to
31. Id.
32. Id. at 45.
33. Id. at 48. The negative earnings trend continues to plague Tyson, which reported a
fiscal third-quarter earnings drop from 9 cents per diluted share compared with 18 cents
per share a year ago. See Tyson Foods Earning Fall, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 31, 2001, at
C5.
34. Tyson, 789 A.2d at 43.
35. Apparently the SEC letter was sent by e-mail to IBP's outside counsel. Id. The
outside counsel looked at it briefly on-line and concluded that it was not necessary to send
it to anyone, including his associates, Tyson, or IBP. Id.
36. Id. at 47.
37. For example, Tyson had received at least 50.1% of lBP shares and obtained all re-
quired approvals. Id. at 79.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 47.
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move forward with the Cash Election Merger, scheduled to close
on or before May 15, 2001.41
On March 28, 2001, with the SEC concerns about DFG unre-
solved, and both IBP and Tyson facing declining market perform-
ance, Don Tyson, the founder and controlling shareholder of Ty-
son Foods, called a meeting of Tyson management and directors
whereupon it was determined that Tyson should not complete the
merger.42 Upon receiving this instruction, Tyson's counsel sent a
letter to IBP notifying them that Tyson considered the Merger
Agreement rescinded or terminated as of that date.4" IBP imme-
diately responded with a suit to enforce the Merger Agreement."
After lengthy discovery and trial, the Chancery Court of Dela-
ware, through Vice Chancellor Strine, reached the following con-
clusions:
* The Merger Agreement and related contracts were valid and
enforceable contracts that were not induced by any material
misrepresentation or omission;
* The Merger Agreement specifically allocated certain risks to
Tyson, including the risk of any losses or financial effects
from the accounting improprieties at DFG, and these risks
cannot serve as a basis for Tyson to terminate the Agree-
ment;
" None of the non-DFG related issues that the SEC raised
constitute a contractually permissible basis for Tyson to
walk away from the Merger;
* IBP has not suffered a Material Adverse Effect within the
meaning of the Agreement that excused Tyson's failure to
close the Merger; and
* Specific performance is the decisively preferable remedy for
Tyson's breach, as it is the only method by which to ade-
quately redress the harm threatened to IBP and its stock-
holders. 45
Of these findings, those with the greatest import for future cases
and for merger parties seeking to avoid litigation are those relat-
41. Id. at 40.
42. Id. at 50.
43. Id. at 50-51. Just before sending this letter to IBP, Tyson filed suit in Arkansas
claiming that it was induced to enter the Merger Agreement through fraud and that IBP
could not perform its obligations under the Agreement. Id. at 51-52.
44. Id. at 51.
45. Id. at 23.
2003]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
ing to the material adverse effect clause and its allocation of risk
between the parties and the conclusion that specific performance
is the appropriate remedy for a jilted seller.46 Each of these find-
ings presents an area where careful attention to both contract
and corporate law is required.
III. MATERIAL ADVERSE EFFECT CLAUSES
A. MAE Clauses Generally
Material Adverse Effect ("MAE") clauses commonly are in-
cluded in merger agreements to protect the parties from changes
in circumstances that may occur between the time of directorial
approval of the agreement and consummation of the transac-
tion.47 This window of time may be lengthy and cautious parties
will try to allocate risk while they wait.48 A typical MAE clause,
as the one in Tyson,49 defines material adverse effect as "'any
event, occurrence or development of a state of circumstances or
facts which has had or reasonably could be expected to have a
Material Adverse Effect'. . . 'on the condition (financial or other-
wise), business, assets, liabilities or results of operations of [IBP]
and (its] Subsidiaries taken as a whole .... ,,,o
Generally, MAE clauses give a party the right to terminate a
merger agreement upon the occurrence of an event or events
specified in the clause during the pendency of the merger. A rep-
resentative MAE clause might define material adverse effect as
"any change or effect that is materially adverse to the business,
financial, condition, assets, properties, operations or results of
operations ... which will prevent.., the fundamental and basic
46. The findings on fraud and misrepresentation are clearly important to the outcome
of this case. However, they are very fact-specific and particular to the transaction between
these parties.
47. Shareholder approval typically is required for legal completion of a merger. In ad-
dition, various regulatory approvals may be necessary depending on the context of the
transaction.
48. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Exclusive Merger Agreements and Lock-Ups in Nego-
tiated Corporate Acquisitions, 75 MINN. L. REV. 239, 240-41 (1990).
49. See supra note 28.
50. Tyson, 789 A.2d at 65 (alteration in original) (quoting the IBP-Tyson merger
agreement).
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operation of such business."51 The right of termination means
that non-completion of the merger is not a breach by that party,
but justified non-performance.52
It is important to recognize the power of an MAE clause. If suc-
cessfully invoked, such a clause prevents a finding of breach of
contract. Given the potentially high costs associated with a
breach, these clauses are important protective devices. Despite
their enormous significance, they are not the subject of much dis-
cussion or analysis by commentators. Writers are beginning to
acknowledge the growing importance of MAE clauses, 3 but re-
markably, there is little guidance on governing legal standards or
the "best" drafting techniques.
What is certain with regard to IAE clauses is that merger par-
ties consider them essential. They are usually the products of in-
tense negotiation because the motivations of sellers and buyers
are diametrically opposed.54 Sellers will seek to include an MAE
clause that is as narrow as possible and strictly limits those
events that qualify as materially adverse. A narrow MAE clause
keeps the buyer obligated in the most possible circumstances.
Further, a narrow, seller-friendly MAE may try to protect a seller
51. See Michael J. Halloran & D. Stanley Rowland, Changes in Material Adverse
Change Provisions in High Tech Deals, M & A LAW., Mar. 1999, at 12 (emphasis omitted).
52. This does not mean that a buyer who walks away from the deal will not suffer any
consequences. Merger agreements commonly include "break-up" fees-amounts due to the
seller if the deal is not consummated for any reason, including justified non-performance.
For more discussion of these fees, see John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, A Buy-
Side Model of M&A Lockups: Theory and Evidence, 53 STAN. L. REV. 307 (2000); Jonathan
T. Wachtel, Comment, Breaking Up is Hard to Do: A Look at Brazen v. Bell Atlantic and
the Controversy over Termination Fees in Mergers and Acquisitions, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 585
(1999). A recent example of these fees is the $50 million break-up fee United Airlines had
to pay when it terminated its merger agreement with US Airways after receiving notice
that the transaction would not receive anti-trust clearance. See David Armstrong, United
Could Lose $1 Billion This Year, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 12, 2001, at El; Melanie Coffee,
United Airlines, US Airways Call off Merger After Government Opposes It, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE, July 28, 2001, at Al.
53. See, e.g., Joel I. Greenberg & A. Julia Haddad, The Material Adverse Change
Clause, 225 N.Y. L.J. 77, Apr. 23, 2001, at S5 (noting "pervasive use of material adverse
change provisions in acquisition agreements"); Halloran & Rowland, supra note 51, at 12
("Material adverse change provisions in merger agreements are changing... because of
the high volatility experienced in stock trading prices and in economic and market condi-
tions . .
54. See, e.g., Rand v. W. Airlines, Inc., No. C.A; 8632, 1994 Del. Ch. LEXIS 26 (Del.
Ch. Feb. 25, 1994) (unpublished opinion) (involving MAE clause significantly weakened
during course of negotiations but only in exchange for inclusion of other protective clauses,
including a lock-up agreement and no-shop provision).
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from downturns in general economic conditions. An MAE clause
may exclude "changes, events, violations, inaccuracies, circum-
stances and effects that are caused by conditions affecting the
United States economy as a whole or affecting the industry in
which [a merger party] competes as a whole, which conditions do
not affect such entity in a disproportionate manner."5 ' The ra-
tionale behind this exclusion is that the risk of bad economic per-
formance should not be placed on the seller if the seller is not re-
sponsible for it. Therefore, sellers should not be penalized for
overall market conditions that are generally beyond their control.
Buyers, of course, prefer broad MAE clauses that include an
expansive definition of material adverse effect. Expansive MAE
clauses provide buyers with greater opportunities to escape from
what later may be regarded as a bad deal. To the extent that the
clauses are buyer friendly, they, in some sense, create an option
contract under which the buyer remains at great liberty to walk
away from the transaction. Buyers resist MLAEs that carve out a
general market downturn from the material adverse effect defini-
tion. They argue that it is impossible to determine whether the
harm to the seller's fortunes, which causes them to seek termina-
tion, was a result of the seller's management or general market
forces. Uncertain about cause, the risk of downturn should be
placed on the seller. Furthermore, to the buyer, the cause of the
decline in the seller's position is irrelevant. Regardless of the
cause, the buyer no longer will receive what it bargained for at
the time it entered into the initial merger agreement.
B. Interpretation of MAE Clauses
From these widely divergent positions, merger parties negoti-
ate strenuously to draft a clause with which all parties can live.
However, even when MAE clauses are negotiated and drafted
carefully, they often become a basis for dispute, as was the case in
Tyson. Whether a material adverse event has occurred is often a
matter of factual interpretation and reasonable parties can hon-
estly disagree.5" Unfortunately, for parties contemplating a
55. Halloran & Rowland, supra note 51, at 13 (emphasis omitted).
56. Many expect these disagreements to surface as merger parties dispute whether
the events of September 11, 2001 constitute an MAE. See Sorkin & Glater, supra note 11.
There is also speculation that MAE clauses drafted post-September 11th will include "acts
[Vol. 37:577
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merger agreement, the law interpreting IAE clauses is not par-
ticularly helpful for drafting purposes and the impact of an MAE
clause can be hard to predict."
This may stem in part from confusion about what body of law-
contract or corporate-should prevail in their interpretation.
MAE clauses are clearly creatures of contract law. Corporate law
also may be relevant if directors invoke an MEA clause to justify
non-performance of a merger because they believe that the trans-
action is no longer in the best interests of their entity. If the
transaction is considered adverse, then, arguably, fiduciary duties
compel the directors not to proceed. By applying standard con-
tract doctrine to the clause, it may be determined that the invoca-
tion of the MAE clause is appropriate. The danger is that corpo-
rate law concerns will cloud contractual analysis. A strict
contractual analysis, applying an objective standard of interpre-
tation, should be utilized to determine if subsequent events con-
stitute an MAE.58 Given courts' tendencies to defer to corporate
law concerns, it is possible that MAE clauses will be interpreted
improperly. If fiduciary duties are considered, then a subjective
inquiry may be made into the directors' beliefs about the meaning
of MAE clauses.
Consider, for example, an MAE clause that allows termination
of the deal when events negatively impact the business or opera-
tions of a merger party (in essence, the type of clause at issue in
Tyson). Directors may allege that their interpretation of "material
adverse effect" must prevail because they have a fiduciary duty to
prevent harm to their shareholders. This may color a court's ap-
plication of an objective analysis of the clause at issue and enable
an MAE clause to be more freely invoked. Consideration of corpo-
of terrorism" as a triggering event. See Richard B. Schmitt & Robin Sidel, 'Terrorism'
Clauses Surface in Latest Deals, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2001, at C1.
57. See, e.g., Esplanade Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Templeton Energy Income Corp., 889 F.2d
621 (5th Cir. 1989) (finding a dramatic price drop in the market not enough to trigger an
MAE clause); Pine State Creamery Co. v. Land-O-Sun Dairies, Inc., No. 5:96-CV-170-30,
1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22035 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 22, 1997) (finding that an MAE clause did not
include changes in the operating profits or losses of corporation); Borders v. KRLB, Inc.,
727 S.W.2d 357 (Tex. App. 1987) (finding that a radio station's loss of over half of its audi-
ence did not trigger the MAE clause).
58. Interpretive rules of contract state that the objective approach shall be used to
interpret disputed terms except in special circumstances, such as when one party knows or
has reason to know of a different meaning attached by the other party. See generally
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201 (1981).
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rate duties could tip the scales improperly when questions of in-
terpretation are close.
If MAE analysis is not clouded by corporate fiduciary duty ar-
guments, contract doctrine provides the proper framework for in-
terpretation. As the Tyson court understood, a court must engage
in careful parsing of the language of the MAE clause itself and of
the language of the merger agreement in which the clause ap-
pears.59 The goal is to effectuate the parties' intentions as ex-
pressed through their choice of contractual language. Achieving
this goal is a complex process and not all judges will engage in it
the same way.6° A party may argue that an MAE clause is unam-
biguous and therefore not subject to interpretation because of the
"plain meaning rule." This rule essentially states that if contrac-
tual language is unambiguous, a court must give it its ordinary
meaning and may not engage in further interpretive inquiry."
Imagine an MAE clause stating that a material adverse effect
justifying termination of the transaction shall be deemed to occur
if the stock price of the target corporation drops more than $1 per
share between signing and completing the merger. Because it is
possible to determine objectively whether that event occurs, the
plain meaning rule would apply. A merger party would be unsuc-
cessful in an attempt to argue that it intended the stock price to
have to drop $1.50 before non-performance was justified. The
problem with the plain meaning rule is that the language is
rarely unambiguous. In the absence of an objective formula, the
question of intent becomes subject to debate.62
If the language of the MAE clause is found to be ambiguous
within the context of the merger agreement, courts must try to
determine what the parties meant to include within it. In reach-
ing a conclusion, courts should
look to all the relevant circumstances... includ[ing] the state of the
world.., the state of the law.., all writings, oral statements, and
other conduct by which the parties manifested their assent, together
59. See 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 7.11, at 283-84 (2d
ed. 1998) ("The agreement is therefore to be read as a whole and.., words used repeat-
edly have a meaning that is the same throughout the contract. ").
60. Id. § 7.7, at 257 ("Judges are not of a single mind in approaching this task of de-
termining the expectations of the parties. They differ in their faith in the reliability of lan-
guage and in the inherent meaning of words.").
61. See id. § 7.12, at 292.
62. See generally Arthur L. Corbin, The Parol Evidence Rule, 53 YALE L.J. 603 (1944).
[Vol. 37:577
CONTROLLING CORPORATE MANAGERS
with any prior negotiations between the parties and any applicable
course of dealings, course of performance, or usage.63
These interpretative rules mandate that the process of deter-
mining the meaning and effect of an MAE clause is very language
and fact specific and goes far towards explaining the unpredict-
able effect of MAE clauses. Parties that draft with a proper un-
derstanding of the rules of contract interpretation and the knowl-
edge that corporate fiduciary duties play no role in this area may
be able to reduce the ambiguity of these clauses. This is not to
suggest that better drafting will remove all uncertainty. Given
the complexity of interpretation, there may be no magic language
guaranteed to accomplish a particular goal. However, studying
cases such as Tyson can reduce some of the uncertainty.
C. MAE Clause Contained in the IBPI Tyson Foods Merger
Agreement
Recall that the Tyson Merger Agreement defined a material
adverse effect as 'any event, occurrence or development of a state
of circumstances or facts which has had or reasonably could be
expected to have a Material Adverse Effect' .. . 'on the condition
(financial or otherwise), business, assets, liabilities or results of
operations of [IBP] and [its] Subsidiaries taken as a whole ....
The non-occurrence of an MAE was a condition to closing. If one
did occur, Tyson was legally justified in terminating the Merger
Agreement and would not be in breach of contract upon doing so.
Tyson relied on this clause in its attempt to justify its refusal to
consummate the purchase of IBP. 5 Tyson first argued that the
decline in IBP's fourth quarter performance in 2000 and first
quarter performance in 2001 constituted a material adverse effect
because it showed the poor financial condition of IBP. 6 It further
argued that the $60 million plus impairment charge taken in
connection with DFG constituted a second material adverse ef-
fect.67 If neither of these events, in isolation, rose to the level of a
63. FARNSWORTH, supra note 59, § 7.10, at 275.
64. IBP, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc. (In re IBP, Inc. S'holders Litig.), 789 A.2d 14, 65
(Del. Ch. 2001) (alteration in original) (quoting the IBP-Tyson merger agreement).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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material adverse effect, Tyson alleged it was "virtually indisput-
able" that the two taken together crossed that threshold."8
The Chancery Court of Delaware was quick to differ with the
assertion that the question of whether an MAE had occurred was
"indisputable."69 Vice Chancellor Strine noted that determining
whether an MAE had occurred "require[d engaging] in an exer-
cise that is quite imprecise" and that proper application of the
words in the MAE clause was "dauntingly complex."" The focus of
the court's discussion was on the poor performance of IBP.7"' On
one hand, Tyson's argument appeared to make sense. There is no
doubt that IBP had suffered poor performance during the quar-
ters in question, Much of this poor performance was apparently
attributable to unfavorable market conditions rather than poor
operations at IBP.73 However, the MAE clause was drafted
broadly and did not carve out a decline in overall market or eco-
nomic conditions.74 Therefore, the MAE clause could be reasona-
bly interpreted to place the risk of market fluctuations on IBP.75
Under that approach, Tyson's non-performance under the Merger
Agreement was justified if IBP's condition had worsened signifi-
cantly from the condition it was in on December 25, 1999-the
date stipulated by the Agreement as defining the baseline for
measuring whether an MAE had occurred-and the time that Ty-
son attempted to walk away from the merger. Neither party dis-
puted that this had happened.76 IBP's poor performance during
the last quarter of 1999 and first quarter of 2000 put it in a sig-
nificantly worse position than it reported on December 25, 1999."7
68. Id.
69. Id. at 71.
70. Id. at 65.
71. See id. at 66-70. With regard to Tyson's allegation that the $60 million impair-
ment charge constituted a material adverse effect, IBP claimed that a one-time, non-cash
charge could not be considered material especially since IBP had taken similar large
charges in the recent past. Id. at 70. Additionally, DFG was only a small fraction of IBP's
overall business and even a total shutdown would have little impact on IBP overall. Id.
Vice Chancellor Strine accepted IBP's position with little discussion. See id. at 71.
72. See id. at 66-70.
73. See id. at 70-71.
74. Id. at 66.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 69-70.
77. See id. at 31.
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However, the court did not read the MAE clause in isolation,
finding that it was ambiguous and needed interpretation. s The
Merger Agreement contained other qualifying language with re-
spect to what events would constitute an MAE. 7' That language
required the court to determine whether an MAE had occurred by
examining the condition of IBP on December 25, 1999, as affected
by specific disclosures made in IBP's warranted financials and
the Merger Agreement itself.80 With those disclosures taken into
account, the question of what time frame should be considered
when determining whether a material adverse effect occurred be-
came less certain. The financials included clear disclosure of the
cyclical nature of the industry and revealed that IBP's actual
earnings did not always reach its projections.8" The critical issue
for the court became whether a failure to meet short-term earn-
ings projections constituted an MAE in light of historic long-term
fluctuations. If only short-term performance was relevant, Tyson
might prevail.12 If long-term trends were considered, one or two
quarters of poor performance would probably not be sufficient to
constitute a material adverse effect.8 3 The language of the Merger
Agreement did not specify whether short or long-term perform-
ance was the intended measuring tool. 4 Furthermore, precedent
in interpreting similar clauses conflicted and provided no clear
guidance to the court.8 5
The court ultimately concluded, hesitantly, that the rational
approach was to consider the long-term history of IBP's perform-
ance. 6 This result can be supported on several grounds. First,
this approach obeys, to the fullest degree possible, the maxim
that contracts are to be construed as a whole. 87 No one clause of
78. See supra notes 34-45 and accompanying text.
79. See Tyson, 789 A.2d at 42-43.
80. See id. at 66.
81. See id. at 67.
82. See id.
83. Id.
84. See id. at 42-43.
85. See, e.g., Pan Am Corp. v. Delta Airlines, 175 B.R. 438, 492-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1994);
Katz v. NVF Co., 473 N.Y.S.2d 786, 788 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
86. Tyson, 789 A.2d at 71.
87. In addition to the MAE clause, Vice Chancellor Strine examined language con-
tained in IBP's warranted financial statements and various schedules to the Merger
Agreement that addressed issues of market risk allocation. See id. at 56-57.
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the Merger Agreement was permitted to take precedence over an-
other and each clause's meaning was considered in context.
Second, after careful examination of the Merger Agreement in
its entirety, the Chancellor concluded, "negotiating realities...
suggest that contractual language must be read in the larger con-
text in which the parties were transacting.""8 This approach is in
accord with the "overarching principle of contract interpretation"
that a court should look at all relevant circumstances surround-
ing the transaction.89 This includes circumstances specific to the
parties, such as prior negotiations or dealings, and those existing
in the world at large.9" Looking through this broad lens, the court
determined that the parties' relationship required application of
long-term economic performance. Tyson was not a short-term
speculator, but an acquiror looking to purchase the company as
part of its long-term strategy. With that understanding, "[iut is
odd to think that a strategic buyer would view a short-term blip
in earnings as material, so long as the target's earnings-
generating potential is not materially affected by that blip or the
blip's cause."91
In addition, finding long-term performance as an appropriate
measure is a reasonable, logical conclusion. An interpretation of
contractual terms leading to a reasonable result is preferred over
one that has a contrary effect.92 The Tyson court's approach set
IBP's status at the time of signing the Merger Agreement as the
baseline for determining whether a material adverse effect had
occurred.93 This approach is logical; if the condition of IBP was
88. Id. at 67.
89. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 59, § 7.10, at 275.
90. See id.
91. Tyson, 789 A.2d at 67.
92. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 203 (1981).
In the interpretation of a promise or agreement or a term thereof, the follow-
ing standards of preference are generally applicable:
(a) an interpretation which gives a reasonable, lawful, and effective mean-
ing to all the terms is preferred to an interpretation which leaves a part un-
reasonable, unlawful, or of no effect ....
Id.
93. Tyson, 789 A.2d at 66. This baseline is the only appropriate one that can be used
since by definition, material adverse effects are changes that occur after a merger agree-
ment is executed but before it is completed. Arguably, Tyson did not know of the true
status of IBP when this baseline was set. For Tyson to prevail on that theory, however,
they needed to show some evidence of fraud in the transaction, a hurdle they were unable
to surmount. See id. at 72. Tyson also might have argued that it was mistaken about IBPs
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materially adverse to Tyson's interests prior to this time, it sim-
ply would have refused to sign the Merger Agreement. Therefore,
it is reasonable to conclude that Tyson intended the MAE to in-
clude only events occurring after it executed the Merger Agree-
ment and prior to closing. Thus, that choice of baseline is pre-
ferred.94
Finally, the court's conclusion also supports the interpretative
maxim that "[wiords and other conduct are interpreted in light of
all the circumstances, and if the principal purpose of the parties
is ascertainable it is given great weight."95 Looking at the purpose
of the merger, the court concluded that Tyson rationally was
more concerned with the long-term earnings of IBP, as it would
be "odd to think that a strategic buyer would view a short-term
blip in earnings as material, so long as the target's earnings-
generating potential is not materially affected by that blip or the
blip's cause."96
The court reasoned that, generally, MAE clauses should be in-
terpreted from a seller-friendly perspective, reasoning that in a
heavily negotiated contract, as merger agreements invariably are,
where sophisticated parties deal with each other at arms' length,
and with the advice of highly skilled experts, the long standing
notion of caveat emptor "applies [in] full force."97 An MVAE clause
should protect the buyer only if overall earnings of the target are
threatened in a "durationally significant manner" in the eyes of a
"reasonable purchaser."" Ultimately, Vice Chancellor Strine
found that while he was "confessedly torn about the correct out-
true status at the time of entry, but under the doctrine of mistake it would bear the risk of
that mistake and be unable to void the Merger Agreement on that ground. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 151-154 (1981).
94. Tyson, 789 A.2d at 66.
95. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202 (1981).
96. Tyson, 789 A.2d at 67. If buyers were concerned with protecting themselves
against any short-term downturn, they could draft their MAE clause to cover that contin-
gency.
97. Id. at 72-73.
98. Id. at 68. With hindsight, it may seem odd that Tyson did not negotiate a more
favorable MAE clause to permit it to withdraw from the Merger Agreement if IBP's per-
formance declined for any reason, regardless of fault. Negotiations took place in a bull
market, and it might seem logical that IBP would agree to such a broad clause. However,
as noted, MAE clauses generally are negotiated heavily and parties are aware that mar-
kets fluctuate greatly. Further, the strength of the market strongly induced Tyson to de-
sire acquiring IBP because Tyson sought market dominance at a time when the market
was favorable.
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come" with regard to the "true" meaning of the MAE clause, in-
terpretative rules of contract law favored IBP's position.99
Using a seller-friendly interpretative approach for broadly
drafted MAE clauses does not mean that the purchaser can never
prevail on their claim that an MAE has occurred. It simply places
the burden on the buyer. Tyson proved unable to meet that bur-
den.100 Although it argued that the decline in IBP's performance
in recent fiscal quarters was sufficiently severe to constitute an
MAE, Tyson's own analysts concluded that this negative trend
was part of a regular business cycle.' 0' Historically, IBP had large
variations in earnings that should have put Tyson on notice. The
court noted that "[alithough IBP may not be performing as well
as... Tyson had hoped," it appeared to be capable of performing
within historic ranges.' 2 Because the court interpreted the MAE
clause as requiring Tyson to demonstrate an unanticipated ad-
verse impact, the historic swings were relevant and precluded a
finding that an MAE had occurred.0 3 This finding was based on
careful application of contract law.0 4
99. Id. at 71.
100. Id.
101. See id.
102. Id.
103. See id. at 70-71.
104. See id. at 65-71. By rooting its decision strongly in contract law, Tyson makes it
clear that merger parties have the power to draft any form of MAE they choose, but that
they must use great care in drafting. First, it is essential that parties pay close attention
to internal consistency of terms. Because courts will interpret contracts as a whole, terms
should be attributed the same definition whenever they appear in the merger agreement.
This suggests that more attention should be paid to the interrelation between the main
text of a merger agreement and any attachments since those documents ordinarily will be
treated as part of the contract. Additionally, if a word is intended to have something other
than its usual definition, parties must be careful to clearly say so. For example, the term
"business" generally will be construed to include not only the physical assets associated
with a company, but the process of exploiting those assets, which includes the financial
activities of operations. See Pine State Creamery Co. v. Land-O-Sun Dairies, Inc., No. 98-
2441, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 31529, at *10 n.1 (4th Cir. Dec. 2, 1999) (refuting the argu-
ment that "business" referred solely to physical assets of a corporation).
Because it is often poor financial performance that arguably triggers an MAE clause,
parties should pay close attention to the definition of materiality in this regard. All busi-
nesses are subject to fluctuations in performance and, as Tyson makes clear, that fact will
be taken into account by courts in determining whether a downturn in performance is suf-
ficiently serious to justify invocation of the MAE clause. If parties want to exclude events
caused by general economic conditions and/or industry specific events from the definition
of material adverse effect, they should spell that out fully. Parties might attempt to cir-
cumvent this problem by including specific thresholds either by dollar amount or percent-
age change in earnings that would automatically qualify as material.
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It is worth noting that Vice Chancellor Strine did not allow
corporate fiduciary duties to cloud contract doctrine. The asser-
tions of Tyson's directors could be viewed as expressing their be-
lief that decline in economic performance adversely impacted
shareholder value. If corporate doctrine creeps into the analysis
of contractual obligation, its concerns of fiduciary obligation to
maximize shareholder wealth might have tipped the scales in Ty-
son's favor. The Tyson court avoided that error with this issue
and with the significant issue of determining appropriate reme-
dies for failed mergers.
IV. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
A. Appropriateness of an Award of Specific Performance to a
Jilted Seller
In addition to addressing the proper method of interpreting the
MAE clause, the Tyson court considered the question of what
award should be given to a jilted seller in a merger. 05
105. See Tyson, 789 A.2d at 82-84. Before turning to the suitability of specific perform-
ance as a remedy for a jilted seller, the court examined several other bases asserted by Ty-
son as justifying their non-performance of the Merger Agreement. It first considered the
issue of whether Tyson was entitled to rescind the Agreement due to fraud. Id. The court
concluded that it was not. Id. at 72. Unlike the situation confronting the court with respect
to the proper interpretation of the MAE clause, the law on fraud is clear. The court broke
no new ground on this issue. Tyson had agreed that "it could not use any oral or written
due diligence information (or omissions therefrom) as a basis for a lawsuit unless that is-
sue was covered by a specific provision of a subsequent, written contract." Id. at 73. Tyson
tried to analogize this clause to a boilerplate merger or contract integration clause, id. at
73 n.180, because "there has been a tendency to deny such clauses conclusive effect." E.
ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.3, at 436 (3d ed. 1999). The court refused to treat
this clause similarly, reasoning that the agreement at issue "is a short and important con-
tract knowingly entered into... Tyson thus seeks to have this court relieve it of a risk it
assumed with full knowledge and to deprive IBP of its legitimate contractual expecta-
tions." Tyson, 789 A.2d at 73 n.180. In light of this clause, Tyson could not claim that it
relied on any assurances of IBP that were not included as specific promises in the Merger
Agreement. See id. Because the basis of Tyson's fraud claims depended on statements not
reduced to writing, they could not prevail and rescission was not allowed. Id. at 74. Tyson
made several other arguments contending that it was entitled to rescission. See id. at 74-
78. Each of these related to actions specific to IBP and Tyson, and would have no rele-
vance in later cases. For this reason, they are not discussed in depth. In brief, Tyson
claimed that certain financial projections were false and misleading, that there were defi-
ciencies in the due diligence process, and that IBP failed to disclose a comment letter from
the SEC. See id. The comment letter addressed issues already mentioned in the due dili-
gence process, including inventory problems at DFG, compliance with SEC accounting
guidelines, and IBP's reporting of its business segments. Id. at 22. The court rejected each
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Having concluded that Tyson breached the Merger Agreement,
the choice before the court was between the specific performance
sought by IBP and money damages.'.°6
Specific performance is not the preferred method of awarding
damages in a contract action.117 Generally, the goal of contract
damages is to protect the expectation interests of the parties by
ensuring that a damage award leaves the non-breaching party in
as good a position as it would have been had the contract been
performed."0 ' In the usual case, this goal can be satisfied by giv-
ing the non-breaching party an award of money damages equal to
the amount of loss suffered under the contract.10 9 Generally, con-
tract damages are considered to be substitutional-a non-
breaching buyer can take the damages and purchase substitute
goods in the market, which, theoretically, puts it in the position it
would have been in had the contract been performed."0
of these claims and found that rescission of the Merger Agreement was not warranted. Id.
at 74-78.
The court then considered whether Tyson had breached the Merger Agreement by refus-
ing to close on its Cash Offer as of February 28, 2001 when the minimum tender condition
of 50.1% of IBP shares had been surpassed and Tyson received the required anti-trust
clearance. Id. at 79. Tyson argued that it could not comply with SEC conditions necessary
to close because it could not provide sufficient financial information about the transaction.
Id. SEC regulations state that "[piro forma financial information is required in a negoti-
ated third-party cash tender offer when securities are intended to be offered in a subse-
quent merger or other transaction in which remaining target securities are acquired and
the acquisition of the subject company is significant to the offeror." Id. (quoting SEC
Schedule TO, Rule 14d-100, Item 10, Instruction 5, 17 C.F.R. § 240, 14d-100 (2002)). In
response, IBP argued that Tyson had an obligation under the Merger Agreement to make
"reasonable best efforts" to close the Cash Offer and could have complied with SEC re-
quirements by constructing pro forma information, which with inclusion of sufficient
qualifications would have passed muster with the SEC. Id. The court ultimately concluded
that IBP failed to prove "with the certainty that is required to sustain a finding of contrac-
tual breach" that it was unreasonable for Tyson to wait until it received certified financial
statements before proceeding with the merger. Id. at 81. It noted that it was unclear that
the SEC would accept a registration statement based on projected restatements of finan-
cial information. Id. Therefore, the court concluded that Tyson did not breach the Merger
Agreement by failing to close the Cash Offer on February 28, 2001. Id. It did, however,
breach its agreement to close the alternative Cash Election Merger by May 15, 2001, be-
cause, as discussed, it had no justification for non-performance on that date. Id. at 81-82.
106. There are infrequent situations when it is impossible to grant specific perform-
ance, such as when the subject matter of the contract is unique and has been destroyed, or
when the performance would require the compulsion of personal services.
107. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 105, § 12.1, at 756.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. § 12.2.
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Due to the court's preference for money damages, a party seek-
ing an award of specific performance must cross a significant
threshold by showing the inadequacy of monetary damages.111 In
making that determination, courts consider several factors. These
include the difficulty of proving damages with reasonable cer-
tainty, the difficulty of procuring a suitable substitute perform-
ance by means of an award of money damages, and the likelihood
that an award of damages could not be collected.
11 2
Before considering the legal standards governing the issue of
damages, it is useful to think about why the directors of a jilted
seller might seek to qualify for an award of specific performance.
It might seem logical that a sufficiently large award of money
damages would satisfy them. After such an award, the directors
would be compensated for the lost value of the merger and still
retain control over their entity. They could re-enter the acquisi-
tions market and find another buyer. If that were to occur, the
seller could be in a favorable position. As Tyson shows, however,
there are many reasons for the seller to prefer forced consumma-
tion of the deal. Tyson faced a dearth of guiding law addressing
the interests of sellers in this situation; therefore, the court rea-
soned from the opposite perspective, where ample precedent ex-
ists. It noted that "[i]f the tables were turned and Tyson was
seeking to enforce the contract, a great deal of precedent would
indicate that the contract should be specifically enforced."
1 13
When the buyer is the non-breaching party in an acquisition, it
generally can argue with success that, absent specific perform-
ance, it cannot be made whole because "the target company is
unique and will yield value of an unquantifiable nature, once
combined with the acquiring company."1 This assertion rests on
a general premise of mergers-the corporation to be acquired of-
fers unique advantages to the acquiring corporation and the com-
111. Precise statements of this general rule vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but
the test is consistent. See, e.g., 96 N.Y. JUR. 2d Specific Performance § 50 (1992) ("Courts
of equity have decreed specific performance of contracts for the sale of a business, particu-
larly where an award of damages would have been inadequate or impracticable.") (cita-
tions omitted).
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 360 (1981).
113. Tyson, 789 A.2d at 82.
114. Id. at 83 (citing True N. Communications, Inc. v. Policies, S.A., 705 A.2d 244 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1997) and Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173
(Del. Super. Ct. 1986)).
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bination of the two will create a new and "better" entity."5 If that
entity does not come into being, the buyer cannot be made whole.
The unique nature of the contract's subject matter places the
transaction in the special category of contract law where specific
performance is appropriate." 6
The impossibility of quantifying a deal that will no longer occur
-absent an award of specific performance-is the same when the
seller is the disadvantaged party. The corporation will still exist
and can be sold to a third party, but the price of that subsequent
transaction cannot be said with certainty to compensate for the
losses arising from the aborted transaction." 7 This is particularly
true when compensation for the original merger included shares
of the buyer."' Benefits from a merger are expected to result in
higher share prices for the surviving corporation. That increased
value was to pass, in some measure, to the seller through the
compensation structure. Because the extent of that increase in
value cannot be determined, money damages cannot compensate
adequately for the loss."9
From a seller's perspective, additional problems arise when a
buyer breaches a merger agreement. These added difficulties help
explain why a jilted seller will seek an award of specific perform-
ance in lieu of money damages. There are numerous intangible
harms to the jilted seller when a merger goes bad. When a merger
is not consummated, the target company can suffer great harm to
its reputation. The buyer's rejection of the deal may leave the im-
pression in the market that the target is "damaged goods" and
harm the overall perception of the seller's worth. Recovery from
this harm may be difficult, if not impossible, and is not easily
quantifiable in a way that allows money damages to compensate
for it. It is true that parties often put a price on non-completion of
115. See, e.g., Allegheny Energy v. DQE, Inc., 171 F.3d 153, 163 (3d Cir. 1999) (discuss-
ing remedy for jilted buyer and finding that the "synergies" of the proposed merger "con-
stitutes a unique, non-replicable business opportunity").
116. See 5 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1142 (1964).
117. See Tyson, 789 A.2d at 82-83.
118. If consideration for the merger was all cash, it may be argued that specific per-
formance is not necessary because the parties agreed on a valuation prior to breach. That
argument may address the problem of valuing a non-existent entity, but does not solve the
other problems facing jilted sellers.
119. See Tyson, 789 A.2d at 82-84 (stating the court's rationale for an award of specific
performance).
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mergers through the inclusion of termination or break-up fees.12°
However, when those provisions are invoked, there is a tacit ac-
knowledgment by'the party walking away that it bears some re-
sponsibility for the failure. If it did not, it would claim breach by
the other party and refuse to pay the predetermined fee. When a
party simply refuses to complete a merger, it signals that the
other party is at fault and the tone of the break-up is significantly
altered. Although a court may ultimately determine that the ac-
tion of walking away was not justified, that decision is likely to be
long delayed. During the pendency of the case, there may be seri-
ous negative impact on the seller's position in the market. The
decline in perceived value of the non-breaching party, from the
time of termination of the merger agreement to the ultimate vin-
dication by court decision, may be impossible to determine.
Furthermore, the seller may have sought a merger because its
management wanted to divest ownership and responsibility. An
award of money damages does not cause a change in the corpo-
rate structure. Even if a subsequent sale to a new purchaser can
be completed, the original expectations of the seller's manage-
ment will not be fulfilled. 2' Even if the seller's management and
others planned to exit post-merger, they likely still care about the
fate of an entity in which they have been vested. Concern about
the future is even more apparent when management intended to
stay. A subsequent sale will leave them in quite a different posi-
tion than they originally envisioned, thus making monetary dam-
ages inadequate. For all of these reasons, it is rational for the
non-breaching party in a merger agreement-be they buyer or
seller-to seek the extraordinary remedy of specific performance.
B. Specific Performance in Tyson
As discussed, the party seeking specific performance of a
merger agreement to date typically has been the buyer. Tyson
presented a unique challenge to the Delaware court because the
120. A "termination fee" or "break-up fee," if agreed to, obligates the target corporation
to pay a predetermined amount of money to the initial merger partner in the event that
the merger is not eventually consummated. See DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., 1 THE BUSINESS
JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS 957 (1998).
121. Fulfilling expectations is a basic premise of contract damages. See FARNSWORTH,
supra note 105, § 12.1, 756 (stating that "the expectation interest.., is said to give the
injured party the 'benefit of the bargain'").
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claim for specific performance was made by the jilted seller.122
The unusual posture of the case may explain why Tyson appar-
ently did not consider the possibility that IBP would argue for
specific performance and failed to address the issue in its
briefs.'23 Perhaps the lack of careful assessment of this remedy by
the parties explains the somewhat summary treatment the court
gave it.' 24 The court's discussion of the suitability of specific per-
formance is noteworthy not for its length or in-depth analysis, but
for the result it reaches.
Acknowledging that if Tyson, the buyer, had been the party
seeking specific performance, it likely would have been granted,
the court concluded that there was not "any compelling reason
why sellers in mergers and acquisitions transactions should have
less of a right to demand specific performance."'25 The court first
looked at whether monetary damages would be adequate compen-
sation and concluded that they would not.'26 The Cash Election
portion of the Merger Agreement, which was the payment option
at issue at the time of breach, allowed IBP shareholders to elect
to receive compensation in cash, in Tyson shares, or a combina-
tion of each. 2 ' Under this arrangement, if the merger was com-
pleted, IBP shareholders had the opportunity to "share in the up-
side of what was touted by Tyson as a unique, synergistic
combination." 2 ' According to the court, the unique nature of the
combination between IBP and Tyson made the determination of
appropriate monetary damages difficult and speculative. 29 There-
fore, although the court is not explicit in this finding, IBP satis-
fied the threshold required for specific performance by demon-
strating the inadequacy of monetary damages. 30
122. The situation was unique not only in Delaware but also elsewhere. A search for
cases involving jilted sellers seeking specific performance of a merger agreement yielded
nothing on point.
123. Tyson, 789 A.2d at 82.
124. See id. at 82-84.
125. Id. at 83.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. See id. This finding should hold true in most merger cases. If the position is ac-
cepted, Tyson Will support imposing the remedy of specific performance. It is important in
this respect to remember that the claim for specific performance arose after full approval
of the merger agreement. Whether specific performance should be granted when a breach
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If this decision is followed by other jurisdictions, it will sound a
strong note in favor of specific performance of merger agree-
ments. If every merger creates a new and unique entity and that
fact is sufficient to make money damages inadequate, specific per-
formance will be the default remedy when a merger is not com-
pleted. The effects that this will have on party negotiations are
interesting to ponder.
The court also considered whether specific performance was a
practicable remedy.131 Even if it is determined that specific per-
formance is the correct remedy, the court expressed concern that
it may not be possible to grant it. 3 2 In Tyson, there were clear in-
dications that the merger could take place as originally contem-
plated. There was evidence suggesting that Tyson still wanted to
acquire IBP, but at a price far lower than the original merger
price, demonstrating that the protesting party believed specific
performance was possible.'33 The court acknowledged that some
difficult personality problems might arise if it ordered specific
performance.' It expressed concern about forcing a merger be-
tween two openly hostile parties, but concluded that Tyson ulti-
mately would have the power to decide all management issues
and therefore, could solve these problems through removal if nec-
essary. '35 While this may not have pleased IBP executives, it did
leave them in the position they would have been in had the
merger been consummated, since Tyson would have had the
power of replacement post-merger under the terms of the Merger
Agreement.'36 Therefore, this outcome seemed fair to the court.'37
occurs prior to full approval is a different matter.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 47-49.
134. Id. at 83.
135. Id. at 83-84.
136. Id. at 84.
137. Id. This suggests that, after Tyson, parties could argue against specific perform-
ance on the ground that it would not be practicable. Although not the subject of this Arti-
cle, interesting (and potentially harmful) results could flow from such a position if the ar-
gument is that management could not function. If managers know of that possibility, they
might be encouraged to be more devisive in their attacks on merger parties and to bad-
mouth the other corporation more vociferously.
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C. Implications of the Decision to Award Specific Performance to
a Jilted Seller
The conclusion reached by the Tyson court and the reasoning
behind its holding seem uncontroversial. When a contract is
breached, careful application of contract law should not give any-
one pause. 38 The opinion is important not only for what it says,
but also what it does not say. Although the potential to do so was
strong, Vice Chancellor Strine did not conflate corporate fiduciary
obligations with contract doctrine.'39 Instead, he properly paid
close attention to contract law demands and raised issues worthy
of closer examination, while he wisely avoided being sidetracked
by potentially competing corporate law concerns.140 Others who
look to the Tyson opinion should be careful to understand and ap-
preciate this approach and not misread the decision. To under-
stand why this warning is necessary, the following discussion
highlights the ease with which Tyson might be misread and iden-
tifies the dangers of doing so.
V. INTERPRETING TYSON
A. Misreading Tyson to Emphasize Corporate Law Concerns
The Tyson opinion is open to a reading that would emphasize
corporate law concerns. Many issues addressed by the court go to
the heart of corporate doctrine.' One of these issues is the de-
gree of consideration that must be given to the interests of vari-
ous corporate constituencies when a merger is contemplated.'
The merger process affects the interests of many groups within
the corporate structure, including, among others, directors, share-
holders, employees, and creditors. 3 The interests of these groups
are not always aligned.'44 For example, shareholders may desire a
particular merger partner because that party offers the highest
138. Id. at 54-55.
139. See id. at 82 n.200.
140. See id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Terry A. O'Neill, Employees' Duty of Loyalty and the Corporate Constitency Debate,
25 CONN. L. REV. 681, 681-84 (1993).
144. Taylor, supra note 8, at 562-77.
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highest price in the short-term.'45 However, directors and em-
ployees may favor a competing party because they believe the
long-term "fit" of the two entities will be superior, ultimately
yielding the best return. 4 6
Corporate law is not necessarily clear about how to balance
these competing interests.'47 The only clear directive is that no
merger can be consummated without approval from at least a ma-
jority of both directors and shareholders.'48 What is unclear is
when and how those approvals must be sought. Directors will
pass on the transaction in the first instance. What if they refuse
an offer? When must shareholders be informed of a merger offer?
Upon its receipt? Upon their approval of it? And what if there are
competing bids? How much discretion do directors have to rec-
ommend a lower priced bid because they believe it offers long-
term benefit?'49 In addition to these questions concerning alloca-
tion of power and control between directors and shareholders,
there are other interests at stake when a merger occurs. 150 Thus,
the issue becomes when and how much weight should be given to
these other groups?'
The Tyson opinion could be read as raising these issues. Con-
sider, for example, the court's allusion to the difficulty of protect-
ing the interests of all constituents affected by the merger.5 2 The
145. Id.
146. Id.; see also Park McGinty, The Twilight of Fiduciary Duties: On the Need for
Shareholder Self-Help in an Age of Formalistic Proceduralism, 46 EMORY L.J. 163 (1997).
147. Taylor, supra note 8, at 562-77; see generally O'Neill, supra note 143.
148. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (2001).
149. See, e.g., McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 918 (Del. 2000); Skeen v. Jo-Ann
Stores, Inc., 750 A.2d 1170, 1174 (Del. 2000); Morton v. Am. Mktg. Indus. Holdings, Inc.,
C.A. No. 14550, 1995 Del. Ch. LEXIS 162 (Del. Ch. Oct. 5, 1995). For a discussion of the
competing interests of directors and shareholders see, for example, Michael Bradley &
Cindy A. Schipani, The Relevance of the Duty of Care Standard in Corporate Governance,
75 IOWA L. REV. 1, 17-19 (1989); Carlos J. Cuevas, The Myth of Fiduciary Duties in Corpo-
rate Reorganization Cases, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 385, 390-92 (1988); Regina M.
Giannini, "Punctilio of Honor" or "Disintegrating Erosion"? The Fiduciary Duty to Disclose
for Partners, Corporate Directors, and Majority Shareholders, 27 Sw. U. L. REV. 73, 74
(1997); Taylor, supra note 8, at 563 n.9.
150. See O'Neill, supra note 143, at 681-84.
151. Traditionalists would argue that corporate law is clear at least to the extent that
no attention need be paid to any constituent group other than shareholders. This position
is increasingly under attack. Many jurisdictions now recognize, through corporate con-
stituency statutes, the right of directors to take broader interests into account should they
choose to do so. See infra note 155 for a more in-depth analysis of employee rights in the
merger context. See also McGinty, supra note 146; O'Neill, supra note 143 at 68-83.
152. IBP, Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc. (In re IBP, Inc. S'holders Litig.), 789 A.2d 14, 82
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Vice Chancellor refers specifically to the "thousands of employ-
ees" of the two corporations, stating, "[t]he impact of a forced
merger on constituencies beyond the stockholders and top man-
agers of IBP and Tyson weighs heavily on my mind."153 Without
an in-depth discussion, he concludes that the impact on constitu-
encies other than shareholders "seems tolerable" because "the Ty-
son constituencies would be better served on the whole by a spe-
cific performance remedy, rather than an award of damages that
did nothing but cost Tyson a 'considerable sum of money."154
Reading the opinion as a pronouncement on corporate law con-
cerns makes this cursory treatment of constituent interests prob-
lematic. First, why mention them at all? Corporate law generally
does not recognize groups other than directors and shareholders
as having rights in the merger process155 because those groups
(together with the officers) are considered the "core" of the corpo-
ration. Creditors may be afforded rights in some special circum-
stances,1 56 but beyond that, the interests of external constituents
generally receive no special treatment.157 If Tyson is read as en-
dorsing consideration of broader constituency interests, its prece-
dential impact will be weakened significantly. Not specifically
addressed is the issue precisely identifying who those broader
constituents are. Should or must the interests of such groups
(however identified) always be considered when evaluating claims
of breach and remedy in the merger context? If so, at what stage
of the process? One specific concern raised when reading Tyson in
this manner is whether employees have legal entitlement to a
voice in determining the attractiveness of the proposed transac-
tion comparable to the rights of shareholders.158 Although all of
these ideas are worthy of debate about the proper contours of cor-
(Del. Ch. 2001).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 84.
155. Although some jurisdictions permit directors to consider other constituencies, in-
cluding employees, creditors, and the community, Delaware does not. Because the vast
majority of corporations are governed by Delaware law, as a general rule only director and
shareholder interests are implicated. See O'Neill, supra note 143, at 682. For an example
of a statute recognizing broader interests, see MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251 (West 1985 &
Supp. 2002).
156. This may result if the terms of the debt instruments contain provisions granting
its holder the right to vote in defined situations.
157. O'Neill, supra note 143, at 681-82.
158. See generally O'Neill, supra note 143 (offering conflicting views on whether corpo-
rate directors owe a fiduciary duty to employees).
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porate fiduciary duty, it seems unlikely that the Tyson court in-
tended to open those doors when it was not necessary or relevant
to the issue presented.
Another corporate law issue capable of mistakenly being un-
derstood as raised by Tyson is proper directorial behavior after a
merger has received director and shareholder approval but before
it is completed.159 Can directors argue at that time that comple-
tion would not be in the best interests of their shareholders de-
spite their prior approval? Under contract doctrine, once the nec-
essary approvals are received and assuming all other conditions
to closing are satisfied, the deal is done.16° Each party then has
the option of completing the transaction, finding a justification for
non-performance (most often by alleging that the other party is in
breach), or paying damages. 6'
Tyson might be seen as changing this landscape. Tyson direc-
tors attempted to use corporate fiduciary duty arguments arising
after contract completion to justify non-performance. ' They no
longer wanted to acquire IBP because they believed, or stated
that they believed, that it would not be in Tyson's best interest.
Acquiring a corporation whose profits were flagging would only
drag down Tyson's financial position. These arguments, if raised
prior to completion, would be given great weight. 63 Corporate law
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty compel directors to act in the
best interests of their shareholders.'64 In the time period between
director approval of a merger agreement and satisfaction of all
conditions to closing, these corporate law concerns trump contrac-
tual protection of the merger party.16 5 Does Tyson suggest that
corporate concern with shareholder interests should also be con-
159. Taylor, supra note 8, at 564 n.10.
160. Id. at 623-28.
161. Id.
162. Tyson, 789 A.2d at 51.
163. See, e.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del.
1989) (upholding as reasonable the termination of a merger when the board of directors
determined that the stock value was inadequate and constituted a danger to corporate pol-
icy and effectiveness).
164. The duty of care requires directors to exercise a level of care that a prudent person
would exercise in the management of her own affairs, while the duty of loyalty requires
directors to act in the absence of self interest in his exercise of judgment. See ROBERT C.
CLARK, CORPORATE LAw §§ 3.4, 4.1 (1986). See generally James A. Fanto, Braking the
Merger Momentum: Reforming Corporate Law Governing Mega-Mergers, 49 BUFF. L. REV.
249 (2001).
165. Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1154.
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sidered in the post-approval stage? Directors eager to avoid "bad
deals" may try to use the decision to support that argument, and
it is one that presents opportunities for interesting theoretical
debate and analysis over the intersection of corporate and con-
tract law. This debate, however, is likely to raise many complex
issues while failing to provide useful guidance or comfort to par-
ties wishing to enter into merger agreements. Greater ease may
be found if Tyson is read properly through a contract, rather than
corporate, law lens.
B. Properly Reading Tyson to Emphasize Contract Law Concerns
With contract law as the guiding tool used in reaching the con-
clusion that Tyson had breached the Merger Agreement and that
IBP was entitled to a grant of specific performance, the problem-
atic issues mentioned above do not arise.166 Fiduciary duties do
not play a role in contract doctrine. As a general rule, contract
law is considered to be "amoral." Parties are free to breach their
agreements as long as they are willing to pay the cost of damages
for that breach or are willing to bear the risk that a court will or-
der them to do so.167 Some duties do attach with or without ex-
plicit agreement. For instance, all contractual parties are bound
by an obligation to act in good faith and to deal fairly with oth-
ers; 168 however, these duties are very limited. Generally, there is
no requirement that parties negotiate in good faith.'69 Also, if par-
ties include language in their agreement defining good faith, the
general understanding of the term will not override or modify
those explicit contractual terms.17 Due to strong notions of "free-
dom of contract," parties otherwise remain free to dictate their
own rules of behavior.
171
166. Tyson, 789 A.2d at 82-83.
167. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 105, § 12.1, at 756 (explaining that "along with the
celebrated freedom to contract goes a considerable freedom to break them as well").
168. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1995); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981).
169. See Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy:
Lon Fulle's "Consideration and Form," 100 COLUM. L. REV. 94, 144 (2000).
170. While parties may not stipulate that they may act in bad faith, they are free to
define appropriate good faith behavior. See Riggs Nat'l Bank of Wash. v. Linch, 36 F.3d
370, 373 (4th Cir. 1994).
171. Regan, supra note 8, at 1.
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When the Tyson court considered whether the Merger Agree-
ment had been breached and the suitability of granting specific
performance to the jilted seller, it was not looking at corporate
law dictates about directorial fiduciary duties. Instead, it was ap-
plying contract law to determine party intent and how to craft an
appropriate remedy. 17 2 This approach strengthens both contract
and corporate law. While a merger is undoubtedly a corporate
transaction, a merger agreement is a contract subject to the rich
body of law governing such instruments. Recognizing this en-
courages careful consideration and treatment of contract law doc-
trine that frequently is disregarded when disputes arise in the
context of a merger. Because of the corporate setting of mergers,
courts usually default to an application of corporate doctrine and
its fiduciary duty requirements without due regard to competing
contractual interests.
If corporate law concerns of fiduciary duties are permitted to
dominate simply because a dispute arises in the merger process,
these fundamental principles are undermined.
Under the guise of fiduciary duty, directors can cause their
corporations to breach agreements without bearing the costs that
otherwise would attach.173 Although this may protect some share-
holders, it subverts the certainty of contract. This undermines the
certainty of contract law and muddies the water for directors at-
tempting to draft merger agreements. Of what value is a signed
document that parties can freely walk away from?
Careful distinction between the roles of contract and corporate
doctrine help make Tyson useful to drafting parties. It eliminates
the need to second-guess how another court might consider the
problematic corporate issues potentially implicated in Tyson. This
is not to suggest that after Tyson there will never be disputes
over merger agreements. All contracts are subject to interpreta-
tive debate, and with the high stakes involved in mergers, parties
are likely to assert their position vigorously. 174 However, to the
extent that parties can be guided by this decision, they may be
able to avoid later disagreements about their merger agreement
or at least minimize the length of time spent fighting about it.
172. Tyson, 789 A.2d at 54-55.
173. See Taylor, supra note 8, at 565; see also Regan, supra note 8, at 82-89.
174. Tyson, 789 A.2d at 54-55.
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VI. CONCLUSION
Uncertain economic times provide strong incentive to reexam-
ine corporate behavior' and the laws that govern it. Tyson pro-
vides a lens for consideration of proper treatment of failed merg-
ers, an area that to date has not been explored fully. Tyson is an
important example of the thoughtful balancing of corporate and
contract law values in this area. It is a strong assertion of the
need to value contract law principles when a proposed merger is
not consummated. It successfully demonstrates that the complex
web of contract and corporate law relevant to this situation can
be navigated, paying due respect to all relevant interests. In
reaching its result, the Tyson court avoids the common problem of
over-emphasizing corporate law fiduciary duties and thereby sub-
verting contract doctrine.
The result does not diminish the importance of corporate doc-
trine-it clearly still plays a critical role in the merger process.
Directors continue to have strong fiduciary duties to their share-
holders and cannot act in an uninformed manner when deciding
whether to enter into a merger agreement or terminate one to
which their corporation is already a party. Those duties should
not act in isolation, however, but must be balanced properly with
the contractual rights and interests of all parties to the merger.
Tyson demonstrates clearly that reaching such a balance is not
only appropriate, but also possible.
The outcome in Tyson-that a reluctant buyer can be forced to
complete a planned purchase-is particularly significant now.
With great economic uncertainty facing our country and a likely
downturn in overall market conditions, we almost undoubtedly
will see more failed transactions than we have to date. Tyson, by
setting precedent that specific performance is the appropriate
remedy in such a situation, sounds a loud warning notice. This
notice makes clear that when the merger process breaks down af-
ter an agreement has been reached, contract law is just as impor-
tant as corporate law in determining the proper resolution. Tyson
also makes clear that the standards applied to determine rights
and obligations when the seller is the potentially breaching party
are the same as when it is the buyer who wants out. Although
Tyson does not put to rest all of the questions that may arise
when a proposed merger is not consummated, it does provide sig-
nificant guidance.
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If Tyson is applied, as this article argues it should be, parties
will be held to their original intentions and great weight will be
placed on the language of the merger agreement. Therefore, par-
ties will be encouraged to draft such agreements carefully and
clearly. If directors have trepidation about the future and wish to
protect themselves, they must pay particular attention to escape
clauses, including those'covering material adverse effects. Tyson
emphasizes the importance of contract doctrine in this area with-
out minimizing corporate directors' fiduciary duties.
While every failed merger will have to be examined on its own
unique facts, Tyson gives strong indications of how protective
contractual provisions will be treated when a merger fails. The
decision ultimately provides a valuable pronouncement on the in-
teraction between contract and corporate principles and a critical
guide for future merger parties.

